1.
The Legal Procedure to Leave the European Union
Unlike the Hotel California -as described in the famous Eagles song to which the paraphrased title of this contribution refers 1 -it is possible to leave international organizations. This is generally true, and even seems to work for 'regional integration organisations' such as the European Union ('EU'). However, in this case the question is whether decades of close legal and political cooperation -resulting in an entanglement of the EU and domestic legal orders, and involving governments, businesses and citizens alike -can really be undone. This short Editorial will try not to repeat the analyses in the many contributions on 'Brexit' over the past few months.
Where most of those contributions addressed the internal EU or UK complexities, I will focus on some issues that are particularly interesting from the perspective of international institutional law.
2 At the moment of writing, the United Kingdom has not officially notified the European Union of its intention to leave. 2 What we know is that on 23 June 2016, a small majority (51.9 percent) of the electorate in the United Kingdom voted in favour of leaving the EU (with a turnout of 72 percent). Since the modifications on the basis of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (entry into force in 2009), the Treaty on European Union ('TEU') expressly allows for Member States to leave the EU. 3 As it is to serve as the main point of reference during the Brexit negotiations, 4 I will quote
Article 50 of the TEU in full:
2 UK Prime Minister May recently announced that this will happen in March 2017. See "Theresa May to trigger article 50 by end of March 2017", The Guardian, October 2, 2016;  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/01/theresa-may-to-propose-great-repeal-bill-tounwind-eu-laws 3 I leave aside the discussion on whether or not this was a good idea, but it has already rightfully been noticed that " [I] ncluding a withdrawal clause in a treaty such as the TEU is asking for trouble. Obviously, this is something the founding fathers of the League of Nations also found out, with Germany and Japan making a quick exit after their domestic ambitions were no longer deemed compatible with the simple ambition of the League to keep the peace. Such an exit can never be prohibited (and it would be wrong even to try), but including a withdrawal clause makes it all too tempting to actually withdraw. Here the law of the possible applies: if a facility is created, it will sooner or later be used -and often enough for all the wrong reasons." Jan Klabbers, 'Editorial: Continent in Crisis', European Journal of International Law, 2016, No. 3, pp. 553-556 at 555. 4 While it has been argued that Article 50 does not necessarily set the rules of the game as a withdrawal could also be based on 'a fundamental change of circumstances' under the Vienna Convention on the Law It is interesting to note that, prior to the required formal notification, legal consequences are already attached to an 'intention' of a Member State to leave the EU. As phrased in the Council's decision (which obviously was still taken with the UK as a member):
Although no notification has as yet been received under Article 50 TEU from its government, a Member State has made it known publicly that it will withdraw from the Union. The order of presidencies of the Council should be amended to take account of that circumstance, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of that Member State.
Indeed, the UK has not even 'checked out' yet, but already its position has changed and some EU institutional rules are being adapted.
The fact that Article 50 allows for Member States to leave is also interesting in the light of States needs to be established, but to leave the Union a State will have to settle the issue with the organisation of which it has become a member (although the UK's withdrawal agreement may very well become a 'mixed agreement', concluded between the EU, the 27 Member States and the UK; and -not unimportant these days -subject to ratification procedures in each of the Member States). However, if at the end of the day no withdrawal agreement can be concluded, the member concerned may still leave (Article 50(3)); by contrast, if an accession agreement cannot be concluded, the applicant cannot become a member. The 'politics of withdrawal' were also clearly exemplified when the USA left the ILO in 1977
(and later rejoined). A number of political controversies, including the appointment of a Soviet national as Assistant-Director-General and the granting of observer status to the PLO, led to this decision. 12 After two years of unsuccessful attempts to change the organization (something we may again witness during the Brexit negotiations), on 1 November 1977 the US Government confirmed its notice to withdraw from the ILO on 6 November, indicating that it "remains ready to return whenever the ILO is again true to its proper principles and procedures" 13 (again, will we see something like this in the EU-UK exit agreement?). Hence, leaving an international organization is possible, but there was a reason that a State joined in the first place and States usually remember this once certain political disputes are solved.
The reason for a period between the notification and the actual withdrawal -in the case of the EU two years, with a possible extension -is that it allows both the leaving Member States and the organization to reorganise things. Indeed, in most cases an international organization needs some time to adapt its structure and procedures to the fact that it has one less Member State One may safely assume that many of these issues were on the table on 29 June 2016 when 27 EU members met in the absence of the UK.
Obviously, an international organization may also be terminated in its entirety; and these days some populist movements consider Brexit to be the first step in the process of ending the European Union. When not just one or two Member States wish to get out, but all of them agree that there is no value in maintaining the organization, it can be dissolved. Yet this hardly ever occurs, as in most cases the tasks of an organization are transferred to a new, succeeding, In the light of these examples, the Brexit situation may indeed be exceptional. Perhaps it is all the more so since EU members clearly indicated their aim to "continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" and to "advance European integration"
(Preamble of the TEU). Indeed, the European integration process is not just an intergovernmental form of cooperation, but expressly includes the nationals of the Member States, who do not only have a right to use and invoke EU law rules, but were even provided with special rights as 'European citizens' (Article 9 of the TEU). EU law is not just law between States, but also law within States. This implies that leaving the EU has a more direct impact on individuals than leaving the UN or any of its specialised agencies (obviously this impact of the EU was the source of the unease in the UK in the first place). The European integration process is often perceived in 'constitutional' terms, and the legal orders of the Member States are far more entangled in the EU's legal system than in any other international organization.
International Legal Consequences of Leaving the EU
A departure from the EU has consequences under international law as well. Part and parcel of the EU's legal regime is the division of competences. EU Member States have agreed to not only give up some internal competences to regulate certain issues which can be better regulated at the level of the EU, but they have equally tasked the EU to handle certain issues in relations with nonMember States. The logic of the internal-external connection is well-known: once States have transferred competences to the EU in their internal relations, they have become far less interesting partners at the international level since they are simply no longer in the position to negotiate and conclude international agreements on those issues. It is true that 'exclusive competences' (competences on the basis of which the EU can conclude international agreements without these being co-signed by the Member States) are scarce, but it is equally true that there are not so many areas left in which the EU Members can engage in international commitments 9 while completely bypassing the EU. In other words: the EU has become a global actor and has become active in most of the key global issues, ranging from trade and investment to development and environment. The EU's treaty database lists 1139 international agreements that were concluded by the EU.
To a large extent, Member States rely on the EU and the expertise of the European
Commission to negotiate and conclude international agreements. This is particularly the case in 'exclusive' policy areas such as trade. Thus, while individual EU members are still full members of the WTO, most of the actual work is done by the European Commission. Over the years, the EU members have lost considerable expertise in international trade law and have not concluded any trade agreements in their own right.
Leaving the EU thus implies that the international legal position of the UK will have to be reset and certain dimensions of its statehood will have to be reactivated. It will no longer be able to rely on the EU's expertise in the WTO, and will have to seriously upgrade its own delegation in international organisations in which it was mainly active as an EU member. 18 In other words: in many situations it will have to shift from being a Member State to being a State again. 19 This, inter alia, entails that the UK may have to renegotiate a large number of international agreements, which -because of the division of competences -were so called 'EU only' agreements to which the Member States were not a party in their own right. As these agreements usually apply to the territories in which the Treaty on European Union is applied, the UK will no longer be covered;
and compare also Article 216(2) of the TFEU, which provides that international agreements concluded by the EU are (arguably only) "binding upon the institutions of the Union and its
Member States". While this was an internal EU issue (Member States are bound to these agreements through EU law), it will become an international issue as the UK will no longer fall under the internal arrangements. One could perhaps argue that the EU merely concluded the agreements 'on behalf of' its Member States and that the UK would thus remain bound once the competences are returned to it. However, there are some serious flaws in this argument. maintain the same legal rights and obligations, it will have to copy and paste the entire agreement and try and turn it into a bilateral agreement with the respective third party or parties.
Needless to say that the renegotiations will be time consuming, not only for the UK but also for all third parties, provided that they are willing to go there in each and every case. In the case of EU-only agreements not so much needs to be changed, although the argument could be made that third States need to be notified of the fact that the agreement will no longer apply to a former Is it possible to imagine a parallel provision concerning the obligations of international organizations? Despite the somewhat loose references which are occasionally made to the 'territory' of an international organization, we cannot speak in this case of 'territory' in the strict Irrespective of the strong link between territory and statehood, and despite the absence of a clear practice, one could argue that obligations like these are linked to the treaty-making capacity that was transferred from the States to the organization (or created for the organization).
And, indeed, the 'territorial scope' of international agreements concluded by the EU is not without meaning. In the case of trade or investment agreements, for instance, a shrinking territory may be particularly worrisome for a third party (if only because in the case of Brexit it loses 64 million consumers). In addition, with regard to multilateral agreements in particular, other aspects, including budgetary reallocations, could become part of the deal. 21 With regard to mixed agreements, different considerations apply to bilateral and multilateral agreements. In the case of bilateral agreements (between the EU/Member States and 12 in a multilateral mixed agreement by a 'UK only' agreement. For this reason, the 'exit-agreement', foreseen in Article 50(2) of the TEU may be expected to include some provisions on how to proceed in these situations, including the need for notifications and other arrangements. and perhaps a transition period, allowing the UK to remain covered by certain international agreements for a certain period.
The UK may not have been the easiest Member State and the general perception is that it never wholeheartedly supported the European integration process. 22 The result of the referendum should also not come as a surprise when the main message UK government officials usually convey when they return from a Brussels meeting is that they succeeded in winning a battle and keeping the EU at a distance. At the same time, as rightfully noted in an Editorial of another journal, the UK has been the driving force behind many of the EU's integration projects and "The UK's judges and advocates general have contributed to the practices and quality of all three courts that currently constitute the CJEU. The UK is also one of the most compliant Member
States with respect to implementing and enforcing EU legal obligations." 23 Indeed, and despite the popular rhetoric, the UK has been as much a part of the EU's integration process as any other
Member State, and once 'checked-out' will realise that leaving is perhaps less easy than it thought.
It also remains to be seen whether, as is so often experienced in other IOs, leaving will serve as a reminder of the need for membership in the first place. [F]or most of modern history the English sought their fortunes elsewhere. Having subdued and absorbed their neighbours in the British Isles, they sailed away to create and empire overseas. Like the Russians, they were definitely Europeans, but with prime extra-European interests. They were, in fact, semi-detached. … The initiators of the first pan-European movement in the 1920s assumed that neither Britain nor Russia would join.
